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Matsushita at Twenty:
A Conference Introduction
Spencer Weber Waller*
1
On September 29, 2006, the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies
hosted a symposium at Loyola University Chicago School of Law
exploring the legacy of the Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.2 This is the
latest in a long series of antitrust symposia at Loyola dating back to the
founding of the Institute in 1994. Since that time, the Institute has been
fortunate to present symposia organized around important, timely, and
controversial topics in antitrust and consumer protection.
These
symposia have included antitrust and health care; 3 antitrust and the new
millennium; 4 competition,
consumer protection
and energy
6
deregulation; 5 and the future of private rights of action in antitrust.

I. THE CASE

The Matsushita decision has had a profound effect on both antitrust
and civil procedure law. As an antitrust decision, Matsushita has
changed the basic ground rules for proof of conspiracy, summary
judgment, and the role of the economist. As a civil procedure decision,
* Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola
University Chicago
School of Law.
1. The Institute is a nonpartisan, independent academic center designed to explore the impact
of antitrust and consumer protection enforcement on the individual consumer and the public, and
to shape policy issues.
For more information about the Institute and its mission, see
http://www.luc.edu/antitrust. The symposium was also cosponsored by Butler Rubin Saltarelli &
Boyd, LLP, the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter, and the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
which is publishing this special symposium of the papers and selected comments from the
conference.
2. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
3. Symposium, Can Antitrust Law Cure Health Care?, 8 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 76 (1995).
4. Symposium, Antitrust Law for the New Millennium: An Examination of Leading Issues in
AntitrustEnforcement Policyfor the Approaching Age, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 97 (1997).
5. Symposium, Competition, Consumer Protection & Energy Deregulation,33 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 749 (2002).
6. Symposium, The Future of Private Rights of Action in Antitrust, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L.
REv. 295 (2004).
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Matsushita was part of the so-called summary judgment trilogy, 7 which
for better or worse, reinvigorated summary judgment in antitrust and
continued the trend toward the vanishing trial in civil litigation
Our 2006 conference thus focused on the effect of
generally.
Matsushita and the ensuing twenty years of lower court decisions on the
proof of conspiracy, summary judgment, and the role of the economist
both in price-fixing litigation and antitrust more broadly.
The key to understanding Matsushita and its legacy is to determine to
what extent the decision transcends its peculiar factual setting and
almost unprecedented scope. The case involved an allegation of a longrunning conspiracy among the entire Japanese electronics industry with
respect to the sales of televisions in the United States. The case
concerned events stretching from the 1950s through the 1970s, and the
litigation itself spanned from 1970 through the Supreme Court's
decision in 1986, which granted summary judgment8 to the defendants
on the principal, but not the only, claims in the case.
The basic gist of the case was that the plaintiffs, American television
manufacturers, alleged an agreement by the Japanese industry to price
high in Japan and price low in the United States to capture the U.S.
market. While there was indisputable evidence that the defendants had
conspired to raise prices in Japan, there was no direct evidence of any
actionable agreement with respect to the U.S. market. There was also
very little circumstantial evidence of any agreement with respect to the
U.S. market, beyond parallel low prices.
Following extensive
discovery, protracted discovery battles, and extensive evidentiary
rulings, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
on the core antitrust counts. 9 After allowing in certain evidence
excluded by the trial court, the Third Circuit reversed, denying
summary judgment, and holding that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence for a jury to infer an unlawful conspiracy aimed at the U.S.
market to warrant a trial. 10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and awarded summary
judgment to the defendants in a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Powell.
The Court held that summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case
was proper unless the plaintiff could show some evidence that tended to
7. See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
8. The litigation itself continued until the Third Circuit granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the remaining issues in the case following the remand from the Supreme Court. In
re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1986).
9. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
10. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 319 (3d Cir. 1983).
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exclude the possibility of independent action. Under the facts of the
case, the Court refused to allow any inference of unlawful conspiracy
sufficient to defeat summary judgment grounds. First, the plaintiffs
theory made little economic sense to the five-member majority, and the
Court suggested that the plaintiffs bore a higher burden of production
under such circumstances.1 1 Second, the Court was concerned that the
case represented an attack on behavior akin to the normal price
competition encouraged by the antitrust laws, and thus summary
judgment should be appropriate absent a genuine issue of material fact
that the defendant engaged in true predatory pricing. 12
Given the nature of Matsushita as one of the few cases about an
alleged long-running and unsuccessful predatory pricing conspiracy, its
impact on more garden-variety price-fixing litigation is more difficult to
discern. On the one hand, cases like Flat Glass13 and High Fructose
Corn Syrup 14 suggest that Matsushita does not have much to add to the
normal standards for summary judgment. According to those cases,
plaintiffs have no special burden where their underlying legal theories
make economic sense and the real question is whether there is a
sufficient quantum of direct and circumstantial evidence to warrant a
trial. Indeed, both cases can be read broadly to rejuvenate theories of
conscious parallelism beyond anything the Supreme Court has endorsed
since its Interstate Circuitdecision in 1939.15 On the other hand, cases
like the Eighth Circuit's Potash decision 16 suggest that Matsushita may
have raised the bar substantially for avoiding summary judgment in a
case where the plaintiff's case has just about everything except the
proverbial smoking gun.
Another way of looking at this issue is to examine whether
Matsushita is, or should be, limited to its status as a summary judgment
case. For example, since Justice Rehnquist voted in the majority of

11. Matsushita,475 U.S. at 595-97.
12. Id. at 588-93.
13. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002).
14. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
15. Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) ("While the
District Court's finding of an agreement of the distributors among themselves is supported by the

evidence, we think that in the circumstances of this case such agreement for the imposition of the
restrictions . .. was not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy.") with Theatre Enters., Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) ("Circumstantial evidence of
consciously parallel may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward

conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.").
16. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., Inc., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
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both Matsushita and the 1992 Kodak decision, 17 there is some evidence
that he and others took the procedural postures of both cases very
seriously.
The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in a case called
Twombly 18 where the question arises as to how much detail is required
in a complaint regarding the existence of a conspiracy in order to
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under
rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If a heightened
pleading standard is imposed in Twombly for antitrust cases under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, then Matsushita will have transcended its
status as a summary judgment case and the Supreme Court will have
taken an important step in a new direction in civil procedure law, one
the Court has not been willing to take so far in any other substantive
area of the law. 19 If the standard for notice pleading remains unchanged
after Twombly, then Matsushita's centrality will be reinforced, and
discovery and summary judgment will be reinforced as the twin
workhorses in our procedural system in separating out the meritorious
from the losing cases.
II. THE CONFERENCE

Our panelists addressed these issues and more at the conference
itself. Professor William Page, the Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar
at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, began with a
thought-provoking paper that sought to reconceptualize the issue of
proof of conspiracy under Matsushita as one inherently involving some
form of communication between the parties in order to distinguish
20
between actionable agreements and mere conscious parallelism.
Michael Freed and Mark McLaughlin explored the implications of
Professor Page's proposal in their comments and discussion during the
symposium. They have provided written comments addressing both
Professor Page's proposal and the general question of proof of

17.

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).

18. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (granting certiorari to review
Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425 F. 3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005)).
19. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (no heightened pleading standards for

employment discrimination cases); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (notice pleading standard for civil rights cases). See also
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (analyzing notice pleading standards of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in opinion by the principal drafter of Federal Rules). Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only cases alleging fraud or mistake require a higher degree of
specificity. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
20. William H. Page, Communication and ConcertedAction, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (2007).
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conspiracy from their perspectives as distinguished practitioners
21
representing primarily plaintiffs and defendants respectively.
The second panel shifted the focus partially from the legal to the
economic issues underlying Matsushita, and focused on the changing
role of the economist and the way that economic expertise is used and

misused in preparing and conducting antitrust litigation. Dr. Michael
Salinger, the Director of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade

Commission, presented the principal paper discussing the role of the
economist more generally in the wake of Matsushita, emphasizing the
predatory pricing aspects of the case. 22 David Marx and Daniel
Shulman offer written comments in their roles as sophisticated
practitioners and users of economic testimony as to the proper role of
the economist in price-fixing litigation. 23 James Morsch and James
Langenfeld, the moderators for the conference panels, team up to offer a
final written comment regarding the role of the economist on the issue
24
of proof of conspiracy itself.

The conference ended on a high note with a lunch keynote address
from Judge Diane Wood of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, a leading jurist and scholar in both procedure and
antitrust. Judge Wood's remarks summed up most of the themes of the
panels and explored the dilemma of Matsushita for the lower courts and
litigants.
On behalf of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and all the
other cosponsors of the symposium, we are proud to present this special
issue of the Law Journal devoted to both the conference and antitrust
21. Michael J. Freed, Comments on Professor Page's Discussion of Matsushita.: Plaintiffs'
Perspectives, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 461 (2007); T. Mark McLaughlin, Comments on Professor
Page's Discussion of Matsushita, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 467 (2007). Mr. Freed is a name partner
in the firm of Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC where he represents primarily plaintiffs in
class action antitrust and securities fraud litigation. Mr. McLaughlin is a partner in the firm of
Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP where he represents primarily defendants in antitrust and other
types of business litigation, including class actions.
22. Michael A. Salinger, The Legacy of Matsushita: The Role of Economics in Antitrust
Litigation,38 LOY. U. Can. L.J. 475 (2007).
23. David Marx, Jr, The "Proper"-And by That I Mean Limited-Role for Economists in
Price-FixingLitigation, 38 LOY. U. CHn. L.J. 491 (2007); Daniel R. Shulman, Matsushita and the
Role of Economists with Regard to Proof of Conspiracy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 497 (2007). Mr.
Marx is the head of the Chicago antitrust practice for the firm of McDermott Will & Emery where
he represents primarily defendants in antitrust counseling and litigation matters. Mr. Shulman is
a partner in the Minneapolis firm of Gray Plant & Mooty where he represents both plaintiffs and
defendants in antitrust litigation.
24. James Langenfeld & James Morsch, Refining the Matsushita Standard and the Role
Economics Can Play, 38 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 507 (2007). Dr. Langenfeld is an economist and
director at LECG and Mr. Morsch is the Chair of the Antitrust and Competition Group at Butler
Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, one of the cosponsors of the conference.
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law more generally. The symposium and other lead articles present a
snapshot of the vital issues of the day in a critical area of the law for
both consumers and producers alike.
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